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“Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair”: Risk, Security,
Danger, the Constitution, and the Clinician’s Dilemma
Michael L. Perlin*
Alison J. Lynch**
INTRODUCTION
Persons institutionalized in psychiatric institutions and facilities for persons
with intellectual disabilities have always been hidden from view. 1 Facilities were
often constructed far from major urban centers, availability of transportation to
such institutions was often limited, and those who were locked up were, to the
public, faceless and seen as less than human.2 Although there were sporadic
exposés in the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century that attempted to
shed light on the way these individuals were being forced to live, 3 it was not until
the civil rights revolution reached psychiatric hospitals and facilities for persons
with intellectual disabilities in the early 1970s that there was any true public
awareness of the conditions in such facilities.4 This increased recognition of the
deplorable conditions which were the norm then led to an “explosion” of litigation on
behalf of those in psychiatric hospitals or facilities for developmental disabilities,
further raising awareness in the public and the courts nationwide.5

*

**
1

2
3
4
5

Professor Emeritus of Law, New York Law School. Founding Director, International Mental Disability
Law Reform Project; Founding Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program; Co-founder, Mental
Disability Law and Policy Associates. A.B., Rutgers University; J.D. Columbia University School of
Law.
Staff Attorney, Disability Rights New York’s Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental
Illness (PAIMI) Program; Association, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. J.D. New York
Law School, M.A. (Mental Disability Law Studies) New York Law School.
For a graphic example, see Mental Disability Rights Int'l, Hidden Suffering: Romania's Segregation
and Abuse of Infants and Children with Disabilities (2006),
http://www.disabilityrightsintl.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/romania-May-9-final_ withphotos.pdf
(reporting on human rights abuses against children with disabilities in institutions in Romania).
See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 43 (2000); see also
Evelyn W. Lusthaus, Involuntary Euthanasia and Current Attempts to Define Persons with Mental
Retardation as Less Than Human, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 148, 148 (1985).
See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 3-2.2,
at 3-15 to 3-19 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing work of Dorothea Dix, E.P.W. Packard and Albert Deutsch).
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally
Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 (1987).
See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You That Hide Behind Walls”: The
Relationship Between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention
Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in TORTURE AND ILLTREATMENT IN HEALTH- CARE SETTINGS: A COMPILATION 195 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Ctr. on
Humanitarian Law ed., 2013); see also Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Institutional
Forensic Psychiatry: The Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE MEASURES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC
CARE: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 9 (Birgit Völlm & Norbert Nedopil eds., 2016).

410

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[5:2

However, “[m]uch of [this] case law ignores forensic patients entirely.”6 By
and large (although not exclusively),7 the facilities that were the subject of this
litigation (and the concomitant press scrutiny)8 were facilities that mostly housed
patients who had never been charged with or tried on criminal charges—a fact that
is, interestingly and ironically, discordant with the false “ordinary common sense”9
belief held by many in society which posits that “[m]ost mentally ill individuals are
dangerous and frightening [and] are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally
ill persons.”10
Even in this hidden world of those institutionalized because of psychiatric disability
(or alleged disability), forensic patients – mostly those awaiting incompetency-tostand trial determinations, those found permanently incompetent to stand trial,
those . . . acquitted by reason of insanity, and, in some jurisdictions, individuals
transferred from correctional facilities – [have always] remain[ed] the most hidden.11

There has been little dignity present either in the conditions of the institutions in
which such individuals have been housed or in the treatment that they have
received.12
Given their involvement with the criminal justice system and the mental
health system simultaneously, this population has always been doubly stigmatized.
Almost twenty-five years ago, one of the authors (MLP) wrote: “In the criminal
6

7

8
9

10
11
12

Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual
Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in
Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 488 (2008). See also Maya Sabatello, Where Have the Rights of Forensic
Patients Gone?, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 77, 78 (2015) (“[F]orensic patients . . . remained largely
invisible throughout the drafting process [of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities [CRPD]”). On the CRPD in general, see infra text accompanying notes 132–70.
See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1201–02 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see also Perlin, supra note 6,
at 488 (“Of the important [first generation right-to-treatment institutional conditions cases], forensic
patients were part of the plaintiff class only in the Ohio case of Davis v. Watkins.”). For a full discussion
of Davis, see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 7-3.2, at 7-7673 to 7-7876.
For the role of the press, see Paul Davis, Wyatt v. Stickney: Did We Get It Right This Time?, 35 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 143, 153 (2011).
See Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMPLE POL. & C.R.
L. REV. 1, 38 (2012) (“[Ordinary common sense] is self-referential and non-reflective (‘I see it that way,
therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the way it is’).”).
Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 683, 724 n.220 (2003).
See Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 196; see also Perlin, supra note 5 (noting that forensic patients
have traditionally been hidden from public view, the legal system, and the mental-health system).
See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 7 (2013); Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between
International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot eds.,
2013). This is not solely a US-based issue. On the disregard for the dignity of forensic patients in
Austria, see, for example, Independent Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Forensic Commitment-Statement on the Current
Situation and Prevention at 4–5 (Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing “a disregard for dignity”).
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justice system, the mentally disabled were doubly cursed as ‘mad’ and ‘bad’, and
were regularly consigned to lifetime commitments in maximum security facilities.”13
Attitudes remain the same today.14 Forensic patients face stigma both from their
status as “defendant” and as being “mentally ill.”15
For decades, any person with a mental disability involved in the criminal
process at any level was automatically and permanently housed in a maximum
security forensic hospital, from which there was virtually no exit route (other than
death). 16 The US Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana17—on paper,
at least18—limited the length of time that a forensic person who was not likely to
regain his competency to stand trial could be housed in such a facility,19 unless

13

14
15

16
17
18

19

Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (1992) (quoting, in part, Ellen
Hochstedler, Twice-Cursed? The Mentally Disordered Criminal Defendant, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 251
(1987)).
See, e.g., James D. Livingston, Katherine R. Rossier & Simon N. Verdun-Jones, ‘Forensic’ Labelling: An
Empirical Assessment of Its Effects on Self-Stigma for People with Severe Mental Illness, 188
PSYCHIATRY RES. 115, 116 (2011).
The stigma that forensic patients face was recognized by the Supreme Court as long ago as 1966, in
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1966) (differences between civil and forensic facilities
sufficient to require procedural protections for the individuals subject to placement decisions), as
discussed in Roy E. Pardee III, Fear and Loathing in Louisiana: Confining the Sane Dangerous Insanity
Acquittee, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 223, 246 n.237 (1994).
See A. Louis McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review
and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REV. 46, 50 n.20 (1969) (reporting that more men committed as incompetent to
stand trial “had left Bridgewater as a result of death than all other avenues combined”).
406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972).
Incredibly, Jackson continues to be ignored by about half the states. See Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring
Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 921, 941 (1985); see also Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals
with Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
332, 336 (1991). Winick’s research has been updated in Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind?
Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) (explaining that a decade after Winick published his article, Jackson remained
“ignored [and] circumvented.”); see also Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact
of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV.
193, 204 (2000) (“[M]ore than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of incompetent-tostand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson's specific language outlawing this practice.”); Andrew R.
Kaufman, Bruce B. Way & Enrico Suardi, Forty Years After Jackson v. Indiana: States’ Compliance
with “Reasonable Period of Time” Ruling, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 261 (2012) (most states
out of compliance with Jackson). At least one state Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned
procedures that ignore the Jackson holding. See State v. Werner, 796 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct. App.
1990) (not error to treat dangerous patients committed pursuant to Jackson differently from civil
patients).For a discussion of all related issues, see Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”:
Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 347 (2013) (Perlin, Wisdom).
Said the Court in Jackson:
Indiana cannot constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period
simply on account of his incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed
against him. . . . [B]y subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally
applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning
him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required
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there was an independent showing of such dangerousness that he could not safely
be housed elsewhere.20 Also, the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)21 has called into question the legality of placing all incompetent patients—no
matter what their individual level of dangerousness or their charged offense—in
maximum security facilities, solely by nature of the fact that there is a criminal
detainer lodged against them.22
A critical question that remains mostly unanswered for forensic hospitals is
the extent of a patient’s perceived dangerousness that is required for such secure
hospital commitment as opposed to what is acceptable prior to transfer to a nonsecure facility.23 The question of dangerousness required has been and remains an
important one in the minds of patients, those treating them, and the public at large.
While some judges and legislators in the United States have begun to directly
address the issue, a fair amount of ambiguity remains.24 This ambiguity—along
with the lack of agreement and clarification by the courts—may ultimately lead to a

20
21
22

23

24

for commitment or the opportunity for release . . . Indiana deprived petitioner
of equal protection.
406 U.S. at 720, 730.
Id. at 728, 733, 738.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006).
Perlin, supra note 18, at 201–07. In a study of all cases heard by New Zealand’s Mental Health Review
Tribunal over an eighteen year period, it was found that the Tribunal recommended change in legal
status in only two percent of all forensic cases. See KATEY THOM ET AL., BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
WITH PUBLIC POLICY: THE DECISION-MAKING OF THE MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW TRIBUNAL 23 (2014). In
Australia, only a “small number” of forensic patients is even provided representation. See ELEANORE
FRITZE, SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: REPORT OF THE JACK BROCKHOFF FOUNDATION
CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIP TO BETTER PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES, DETAINED IN CLOSED ENVIRONMENTS FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT, THROUGH THE USE OF
LEGAL SERVICES 36 n.233 (2015).
For discussions of New York’s policy on transfer to non-secure facilities based on CPL § 33.20, see Ernst
J. v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2006); Richard S. v. Carpinello, 628 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y.
2008); In re David B., 766 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 2002). For application of the New York “3 track” system of
categorizing mental disorders and the appropriateness of secure confinement, see In re Amir F., 94
A.D.3d 1209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012), In re Eric U., 40 A.D.3d 1148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); In re Torres,
166 A.D.2d 228, 228–29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (Commissioner of Mental Health failed to meet burden of
showing level of dangerousness required to confine defendant in secure facility); People v. Salem, 122
A.D.2d 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). The different “tracks” in the N.Y. system are explained infra text
accompanying notes 45–50. Ironically, many “non-secure” facilities are becoming increasingly locked
down, and it is becoming more difficult to tell the differences between the levels of dangerousness
required by these facilities, which should in theory be readily distinguishable.
Transfers are, of course, often based on (usually informal) risk assessments. See infra text
accompanying notes 89–91 on the inherent ambiguity often present in such assessment decisionmaking. At least one court has ruled that, as the question before it was “only with requests for transfer
from one mental hospital to another, and not with requests for release, the concern for psychiatric
predictions of dangerousness [is] not relevant here.” In re Hospitalization of Patterson, 372 A.2d 1173,
1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 383 A.2d 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978), cert. denied, 391 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1978).
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violation of a person’s right to be confined in the least restrictive alternative, a right
that applies in all settings to all patients confined in hospitals. 25
This potential for the violation of patients’ rights is especially troubling
because of recent developments in international human rights law, especially the
ratification of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD).26 As we will discuss below, the CRPD is the most revolutionary
international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with
disabilities.27 It furthers the human rights approach to disability—endorsing a
social model and repudiating a purely medical model—and recognizes the right of
people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life.28 Although little
attention has been paid to its potential impact on forensic patients,29 we believe it is
essential that there be a new focus notwithstanding the fact that virtually no
consideration of the Convention’s application to this population yet appears in the
literature.30
This Article will address these issues individually and together as they
appear in the United States and under international law principles.31 We will
consider “risk” in two ways: first, the need for clinicians to be able to assess a
patient’s risk in both secure and non-secure facilities and second, the legal risk to
clinicians if their assessment is wrong. We will also address “security” because an
emphasis on safety is at the forefront of the minds of the public as well as judges
involved in cases where dangerousness is considered.32 We will also discuss

25
26
27

28
29

30
31
32

See infra text accompanying notes 65–70, discussing, inter alia, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); see also Perlin,
supra note 18, at 217–18 (discussing these cases in a parallel context).
G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2007); see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 143–59
(2012).
See generally Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 98
(Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012); PERLIN, supra note 26, at 3–21; Michael L. Perlin, “A Change Is
Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483,
484 (2009).
See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The
Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 191–92 (2005).
But see Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 16. One of the co-authors (MLP) discusses this further in
Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the
Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2017).
Dhir, supra note 28, at 201–02.
In this paper, we focus on New York state, but the issues affect forensic facilities in all the states.
“Judges are embedded in the cultural presuppositions that engulf us all.” PERLIN, supra note 2, at 47.
On the bias often shown by judges towards litigants with mental disabilities, see, e.g., JOHN PARRY &
ERIC Y. DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 5 (2000); Perlin, supra note 13, at 377. This bias is sanism: “an irrational prejudice of the
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“danger” as it is the basis for many statutes governing confinement of the mentally
ill, and “dangerousness” itself is a particularly indefinable term in this context.
Finally, we will discuss the issue of “human rights” because of the importance of the
CRPD as well as the importance of ensuring fair treatment in all nations.
We are then faced with the “clinician’s dilemma,” which occurs each time a
treatment provider attempts to combine these previously-described topics into a
formula to apply to his patients. This dilemma is made more obvious by the
discordance in case law and statutes, as well as organized psychiatry’s reliance on
dangerousness predictions that continue to be unreliable at best, and prejudicial at
worst. We will also consider all of the issues in question through the prism of TJ in
an effort to determine whether current policies are, in fact, therapeutic or antitherapeutic and whether or not they reflect the “ethic of care” mandated by TJ.33
The first portion of the title of this paper comes from Every Grain of Sand,34
one of Bob Dylan’s very saddest and most beautifully-imaged songs;35 one, according
to the critic Paul Williams that “reaches beyond its context to communicate a deeply
felt devotional spirit based on universal experiences: pain of self-awareness, and
sense of wonder or awe,” and is about “the moment(s) [that] we accept our pain and
vulnerability.”36 We believe, as we will discuss subsequently in the Article, that the
lyric in question truly defines the conundrum we face.
I.

FORENSIC AND SECURE FACILITIES
A. Introduction

To confront the questions that we raise in this paper, it is necessary to first
consider the extent of dangerousness that is required for secure hospital
commitment versus transfer to a non-secure facility—a question that was first
raised to one of the authors (MLP) over eleven years ago by the then-head of the
Kirby Forensic Center in New York City, one of New York state’s two maximum

33
34
35

36

same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry.” See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
“Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2013).
See infra text accompanying notes 175–207.
Bob Dylan, Every Grain of Sand, BOB DYLAN, http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/every-grain-sand (last
visited Mar. 29, 2017).
The lyric comes from the first verse:
In the time of my confession, in the hour of my deepest need
When the pool of tears beneath my feet flood every newborn seed
There’s a dyin’ voice within me reaching out somewhere
Toiling in the danger and in the morals of despair.
PAUL WILLIAMS, BOB DYLAN: PERFORMING ARTIST, 1974–1986, THE MIDDLE YEARS 1974–1986, at 205
(1992). For a lengthy analysis of Every Grain, see generally MICHAEL GRAY, SONG AND DANCE MAN III:
THE ART OF BOB DYLAN 400–25 (2000).
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security forensic hospitals. 37 This issue becomes especially important as “nonsecure” facilities have become increasingly locked down to the extent that there is
now, in many important ways, little difference between facilities. This lack of
discernible differences between various types of facilities looms even larger in light
of statutes and judicial decisions mandating that patients be placed in the least
restrictive alternative settings appropriate for their treatment.38
B. New York State Law
We will focus here on New York developments. Under the relevant statute,
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 330.20(1)(c), the term “dangerous
mental disorder” means: (i) that a defendant currently suffers from a “mental
illness” and (ii) that “because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical
danger to himself or others.”39 If we examine the New York Court of Appeals’
decisions from the past two decades, certain controlling principles emerge.
It is constitutionally permissible for the state to engage in a presumption
that a defendant’s “causative mental illness” has continued beyond the date of the
original conduct (that would have been criminal but for the defendant’s lack of
criminal responsibility),40 and a finding of current danger may be made:
by presenting proof of a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, substance
abuse or dangerous activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment, or
upon evidence establishing that continued medication is necessary to control
defendant’s violent tendencies and that defendant is likely not to comply with
prescribed medication because of a prior history of such noncompliance or because of
threats of future noncompliance.41

Extended supervision is justified, in significant part, because of the “inability
of modern psychiatry to guarantee the safety of the public through effective
37
38
39

40

41

Email from Jim Hicks, M.D., Assoc. Clinical Dir., Kirby Forensic Center, to Michael L. Perlin, Dir.,
International Mental Disability Law Reform Project & Online Mental Disability Law Program, New
York Law School (Apr. 3, 2006) (on file with authors).
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330 (McKinney Supp. 2017); In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956
N.Y.S.2d 848, 853–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
See also, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330.20(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 2017) (stating that “[m]entally ill” means
that a defendant currently suffers from a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient, in
the in-patient services of a psychiatric center under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health,
is essential to such defendant's welfare and that his judgment is so impaired that he is unable to
understand the need for such care and treatment).
In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 480 (1995) (quoting In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1979)). In re
George L. was most recently cited in this context in New York in Makas v. Mid-Hudson Forensic
Psychiatric Center, 905 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 2010); In re Justice v. Evans, 23 N.Y.S.3d 749, 750 (App.
Div. 2016) (citing George L. when holding that a recommitment order must be premised on proof that
may include “a history of prior relapses into violent behavior, [or] substance abuse or dangerous
activities upon release or termination of psychiatric treatment”); State v. Matter, 958 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558
(App. Div. 2013) (“Contrary to respondent’s contention, proof of his past conduct is probative of his
present mental state.”).
George L., 648 N.E.2d at 81.
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treatment permanently removing the potentiality of recurrent violent acts by
persons found not responsible by reason of mental illness, thereby justifying
extended continuous supervision over the acquittee by the criminal court through
an order of conditions.”42
[Some] constitutionally required minimum level of dangerousness to oneself or others
that must be shown before an insanity acquittee may be retained in a non-secure
facility, [but] a finding that an individual is ‘mentally ill’ . . . under CPL §
330.20(1)(d)43 contemplates a degree of dangerousness that satisfies due process
concerns.44

The statute contemplates a three-tier track system.45 Those suffering from a
“dangerous mental disorder” (Track 1)46 are subject to “continued, direct
oversight.”47 Those “mentally ill” (for these purposes, persons whose illnesses
require inpatient care and treatment that is essential to the defendant’s welfare,
and who, because of impaired judgment, do not understand the need for such care
and treatment) (Track 2) are governed by the civil commitment laws.48 Those who
are neither mentally ill nor dangerous under these definitions (Track 3) are entitled
to immediate release with or without conditions.49 Other factors to consider in
determining whether a Track 2 acquittee needs continued retention in a non-secure
facility include:
 the need to prepare for a safe and stable transition from non-secure
commitment to release,
 evidence of recent acts of violence and the risk of harm to the defendant
or others,
 the nature of the conduct that resulted in the initial commitment,
 the likelihood of relapse or a cure,
 history of substance or alcohol abuse,
42
43
44

45

46
47
48
49

In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 885 (N.Y. 1995).
See supra note 39 discussion.
In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 570 (N.Y. 2002). Most recently, in Makas, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 480.,, on the
facts of the case before it, the trial court concluded that in the case of an individual who suffered from a
mental illness but not a “dangerous” mental illness, it did not have authority to change his commitment
from a secure to a non-secure facility.
On the differential in appeal processes in Track 1 and Track 2 cases, see In re Jamie R., 844 N.E.2d
285, 291 (N.Y. 2006) (stating that the track status of track 2 patient can only be changed on appeal, not
by review hearing); In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d 642, 643 (N.Y. 2004) (noting that the track status of a
track 1 patient can only be changed on appeal, not by review hearing). For more recent discussions of
New York’s track system in this context, see In re Robert T. v. Sproat, 955 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2012); People v. Sharon T., No. 1735/09, 2011 WL 1900047, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2011).
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 330.20(6) (McKinney Supp. 2017).
In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 571 n.4. See also e.g., Allen B. v. Sproat, 991 N.Y.S.2d 386 (2014) (a
supervising court in a track-1 case may include in an order of conditions for release an effectiveevaluation provision).
David B., 755 N.E.2d at 571.
Id.
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the effects of medication,
the likelihood that the patient will discontinue medication without
supervision,
the length of confinement and treatment,
the lapse of time since the underlying criminal acts, and
“any other relevant factors that form a part of an insanity acquittee’s
psychological profile.”50

C. Constitutional Dimensions
With this statutory predicate, we must also consider the constitutional
imperative that we apply the concept of the least restrictive alternative to all
institutional mental disability law decision making. There is no question that the
constitutional mandate of providing the least restrictive alternative (LRA)—first
famously spelled out in a mental disability law context well over forty years ago in
the case of Lessard v. Schmidt51—applies to all aspects of institutional decision
making, whether they involve civil patients or forensic patients. This broad
application has been made clear by the US Supreme Court, other relevant federal
courts, and the New York state courts.
In Lessard, the federal district court ruled that “even if the standards for an
adjudication of mental illness and potential dangerousness are satisfied, a court
should order full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a last resort.”52 Quoting
Shelton v. Tucker,53 the court characterized “the most basic and fundamental right
[as] the right to be free from unwanted restraint,”54 concluding that “persons
suffering from the condition of being mentally ill but who are not alleged to have
committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less
drastic means for achieving the same basic goal.”55 The court placed the burden for
exploring alternatives to institutionalization on “the person recommending full-time
involuntary hospitalization,”56 who must prove the following:
(1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3)
why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable. These alternatives
include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a
hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or

50
51

52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 572.
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); see also Michael
L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS.
L. REV. 63, 86 n.138 (1991).
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Shelton involved the associational rights of public schoolteachers; see id.
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1095–96.
Id. at 1096.
Id.
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relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental health clinic,
and home health aide services.57

These principles have been articulated in multiple New York state cases,
dating back to the 1973 decision of Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous:58 “To subject a
person to a greater deprivation of personal liberty than necessary to achieve the
purpose for which he is being confined is, it is clear, violative of due process.”59
Subsequent New York cases have been in accord. By way of example, Ughetto v.
Acrish states the principle this way: “The burden of proof at such a hearing is upon
the hospital to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the patient poses a
substantial threat to himself or others and that involuntary commitment is the
least restrictive means available for treatment.”60
Courts in other jurisdictions have specifically ruled that the LRA principles
apply to the transfer of patients from a less secure hospital to a more secure
hospital.61 Although this issue has never been dealt with squarely by a New York
court, the Mental Hygiene Legal Services ex rel. Aliza K. v. Ford 62 decision (which
did not require a full due process hearing prior to the transfer of a patient to a more
secure facility) indicated that, where the “stigma of being a patient at [the more
secure facility] may be greater than that of being hospitalized at [the less secure
facility, such a] transfer implicates a liberty interest which triggers rights to
procedural due process,”63 citing Kesselbrenner and the US Supreme Court’s prisonhospital transfer case of Vitek v. Jones.64
The LRA principle has been articulated in two very different ways in three
US Supreme Court cases. In 1990, in Riggins v. Nevada,65 reversing a conviction in
a case where a competent defendant pleading the insanity defense was medicated at
trial against his will, the Court ruled that such medication would only be allowed if
the state proved either of the following: that (1) the treatment was “medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of
Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others,” or (2) there were no less intrusive
means by which to obtain an adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.66
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
305 N.Y.2d 903, 906 (N.Y. 1973).
Id. at 905.
494 N.Y.S.2d 943, 944 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (citing in re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983)) (reading LRA requirement into Mental Hygiene Law, and holding that only least restrictive
alternative consistent with legitimate purposes of such commitment can be imposed).
See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-4.1.1, at 4-224 to 4-228.
705 N.E.2d 1191, 1194–96 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 194.
445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
504 U.S. 127, 132–35 (1992).
Id. at 135. Subsequently, in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,178–81 (2003), the Supreme Court
expanded on this ruling in a case involving a defendant whom the government was seeking to medicate
so as to make him competent to stand trial. In ruling that medication must necessarily further
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Then, seven years later, in Olmstead v. L.C.,67 the Court construed the ADA to
mandate that a state may place persons with mental disabilities in a less restrictive
setting if the state provides both substantive safeguards in the form of opinions
from treatment professionals and procedural safeguards in the form of a waiting list
to move people into community settings.68 Both before and after its decision in
Olmstead, the Supreme Court has ruled that the ADA applies to prison settings;69 it
is inconceivable that a court would rule that it does not apply to a forensic mental
health facility.70
In short, there is no question that the LRA applies to all cases of persons
institutionalized because of mental disabilities, including forensic patients. 71 One of
the authors (MLP) has previously argued that this is specifically demanded by the
ADA, and we believe that the arguments made there apply specifically to the cases
we are discussing in this paper.72
II.

ON RISK

As discussed above, the word “risk” carries with it multiple meanings in the
context of making determinations about dangerousness, and those determinations
affect a patient’s level of confinement.73 First, there is the risk posed by the patient

67
68
69
70
71

72

73

“significant” state interests, the Court underscored that this could only be done if “any alternative, less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.” Id. at 181.
527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999).
Id. at 602, 605–06. One of the authors (MLP) discusses both Riggins and Olmstead in this context in
Perlin, supra note 18, at 217–18 (written prior to the Sell decision).
See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).
See, e.g., Bates v. Dep’t of Behavioral & Dev. Serv., 863 A.2d 890, 906–07 (Me. 2004).
Some cases from other jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Schuttemeyer v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 124,
128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), reh'g denied (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), discretionary review denied (Ky. 1990)
(holding that evidence would not permit finding that hospitalization was least restrictive alternative
mode of treatment for defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, so as to support involuntary
hospitalization; testifying psychologist unequivocally stated that involuntary hospitalization was not
necessary); State v. Kinman, 671 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (arguing that the state bears
the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence which commitment alternative is least restrictive
at initial determination of whether insanity acquittee should be involuntarily committed). Those that
disagree—see, e.g., People v. Cross, 704 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reasoning that the
requirement under corrections law that insanity acquittee be held in secure setting governed over
requirement under Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code that person involuntarily
committed be held in the least restrictive environment possible); State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 108
(Wis. 1995) (noting that insanity acquittees, unlike other involuntarily committed persons, do not have
right, under prior version of patients' rights statute, to confinement in least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve purposes of their commitment)—all predate Olmstead and thus should be seen as
being of questionable precedential value.
See Perlin, supra note 18, at 194–95 (“I believe that, after Olmstead, policies that mandate that all
defendants awaiting incompetence and insanity evaluations, all defendants found permanently
incompetent . . . and all NGRI acquittees must be evaluated, treated, or confined only in a state's
maximum security facility for the criminally insane violate the ADA.”).
On how assessments of risk and dangerousness are the most important factors in decision making by
tribunals tasked with decisions as to release of persons in psychiatric institutions, see THOM ET AL.,
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himself. That risk may be to others or to himself, and clinicians must be adequately
prepared to predict it accurately, using meaningful assessment tools. Risk and
dangerousness are quite interconnected; the risk of danger posed by a patient is
what determines that patient’s ultimate placement. The risk of future
dangerousness is what keeps clinicians using these risk assessment tools and what
pushes non-secure facilities to become more and more secure.74
However, there is also risk in the context of clinician error. The risk of an
inaccurate prediction of dangerousness can have serious consequences for the
clinician who made the prediction, as well as anyone harmed by the inaccurately
assessed, dangerous individual.75 Further, societal beliefs about the inherent
danger posed by all mentally ill individuals put pressure on clinicians to make
accurate assessments,76 but with that comes pressure to keep individuals with
mental illness confined, even when dangerousness may not actually be at issue, or
the finding of dangerousness may be tenuous at best.77 Even the Supreme Court has
recognized the “fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis” and the issues that then arise
when individuals are deprived of their basic freedoms based on this fallibility.78
Dangerousness itself, as a concept, is also a difficult one,79 given that it can mean
many things in many different contexts, and the fear of dangerousness can have

74

75
76

77

78
79

supra note 22, at 14 (citing, inter alia, JILL PEAY, TRIBUNALS ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
UNDER THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983 (1989)).
But, on the shortcomings of these instruments, see, e.g., Eric Janus & Robert Prentky, Forensic Use of
Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1472 (2003) (“[T]o a greater or lesser extent, all ARA [actuarial risk assessment]
instruments have shortcomings, and these shortcomings detract from the reliability of the
instruments.”); see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION:
THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION (2017).
On such litigation, see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 12-3.14, at 12-198–12-202.
On the “extra-legal pressures on experts to find dangerousness,” see Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State
Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment and Sicherungsverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1621, 1658-59 (2003), (quoting in part Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 202–03(1996) (“[Among
such pressures are] a fear of liability or censure from a false prediction of safety; the absence of any
external consequences from a false prediction of violence . . . ; and the tendency of clinicians to see those
factors which confirm the existing diagnosis and predictions, and ignore those which disconfirm it.”).
See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital
Sentencing, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 532–33 (2002) (noting that individuals undertaking violence
risk assessment are likely to commit a number of fundamental errors unless guided by reliable
scientific methodology and group data, often resulting in an overestimation of violence risk). On the
specific issues raised in this context in death penalty cases, see Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J.
Reidy, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: Common Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital
Sentencing, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 20, 22 (1999).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
See Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 286 (2011) (“If
mental illness is difficult to prove, the dangerousness element is even more difficult because it involves
a prediction of future behavior.”).
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consequences for those labeled as “dangerous.”80 When society believes that a
certain group of people are inherently dangerous and pose greater risks than do
other groups, that belief can result in the continued violation of those individuals’
rights.81 As a result of these dilemmas, there is extra pressure on clinicians and
state officials to always err on the side of retaining patients in more secure
conditions, such decisions being unlikely to result in tart criticism.82 If the patients
involved are forensic patients (thus explicitly having had some contact with the
criminal justice system), these decisions become even easier to justify.
A. The Elasticity of the Word “Dangerousness” and its Multiple Meanings.
Twenty-two years ago, in writing about the application of the then-new field
of “therapeutic jurisprudence”83 to involuntary civil commitment law, one of the
authors (MLP) and two colleagues said this about the “revolution” in commitment
law in the 1970s:
Not incidentally, the initiation of more formal hearings forced medical personnel to
alter the manner in which they testified. For the first time, psychiatrists were
subjected to rigorous cross-examination and were required to substantiate their
medical opinions rather than merely make medical conclusions. At the same time,
psychiatric diagnostic and predictive skills were more closely scrutinized. Lawyers
were often successful in convincing courts that psychiatric diagnoses and predictions
of dangerousness were inaccurate. The meaning of dangerousness also became an
important area of litigation. Critics charged that the concept was “vague” and
“amorphous,” and its “elasticity” has made it “one of the most problematic and
elusive concepts in mental health law.”84

Nothing has changed since the publication of that article over two decades
ago. There are few words in the legal literature as elastic as “dangerousness,”85 an
elasticity that is even more singular in light of the fact that it is a word no longer in
good currency with researchers and clinicians, who have reconceptualized the

80
81

82
83
84
85

On how persons with mental illness are marginalized because of this fear of dangerousness, see
Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on Global Health: A
Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 14 (2013).
On the “inherent fallibility of ‘preventive’ determinations that are based on assessments of future
dangerousness” in the area of detention of suspected terrorists, see Catherine Powell, Scholars’
Statement of Principles for the New President on U.S. Detention Policy: An Agenda for Change, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 340–41 (2009).
See Robert Sade, Introduction: Symposium on Evolution, Prevention, and Responses to Aggressive
Behavior and Violence, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 8, 13 (2004).
See infra text accompanying notes 175–207.
Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 86–87 (1995).
See, e.g., GREGG BARAK, CRIMINOLOGY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 132 (2009).
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relevant inquiry as one that considers the degree of risk86 via validated risk
assessment instruments. 87 According to Professor Christopher Slobogin, one of the
leading legal scholars in this area, “[t]oday, social scientists talk about risk
assessment, not predicting dangerousness, to connote the idea that the potential for
violence is not something that resides solely in the individual, but rather stems
from the interaction of biological, psychological, and social variables.”88 But, even
using the word dangerousness (the criteria specified in New York in § 330),89 we are
confronted by the fact that for thirty years, thoughtful judges, writing nuanced
opinions, have acknowledged that there are multiple dimensions to the word.
As long ago as 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court, writing in State v. Krol,
pointed out that “[d]angerousness is a concept which involves substantial elements
of vagueness and ambiguity,”90 and the court acknowledged the “difficulty of
making valid and meaningful predictions of the likelihood of future harmful
conduct”91 made more difficult by the “subtle but strong pressures upon decision
makers to overpredict dangerousness.”92 In the same opinion, the court noted that
“[a] defendant may be dangerous in only certain types of situations or in connection
with relationships with certain individuals” and that any “evaluation of
dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that defendant
will be exposed to such situations or come into contact with such individuals.”93
Interestingly, Krol, an insanity acquittee case, was one of the first important
state court cases to demand individualized risk assessments (without using that
86

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See, e.g., Aletha Claussen-Schulz, Marc Pearce & Robert Schopp, Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and
Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471 (2004). On the relationship between criminal
history and risk assessments, see Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal
History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2015). Legal scholars have begun to consider
seriously and carefully all aspects of risk assessment decision making in a variety of contexts far
removed from the topic of this paper. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2004); Jonathan Simon, Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Ads to the Study
of Risk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 119, 122 (2005). On the related question of the relationship
between risk and heuristic reasoning, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). One of the authors (MLP)
discusses the power of heuristics in related contexts in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner's
Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996) (“We know how, as a result of the vividness heuristic, one salient case can
lead to the restructuring of an entire body of jurisprudence.”), and Michael L. Perlin & Naomi
Weinstein, “Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’”: Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision
about Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUBLIC
L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. __ (2017) (forthcoming), manuscript at 24 (“One single vivid, memorable case
overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made.”).
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 277 (2006).
On risk assessment in the context of civil commitment, see Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The
“Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (2003).
Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 127–28 (2005).
See supra note 39, for the key provisions of this statute.
State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (N.J. 1975).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302; see also PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 3-5.1.2(b), at 3-102 to 3-109.
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phrase): “[The state’s] contention that, as a class, persons acquitted by reason of
insanity are more likely to be dangerous than other persons does not rationally
establish that any particular individual in the class should be confined even if he is
not dangerous.”94 And, “the disposition must be individualized with the focus on the
offender, not the offense he committed, although such offense can serve as an
indication of the harm the patient is capable of inflicting.”95
While Krol has no precedential value in New York (which has, in cases such
as Jamie R. v. Consilvio96 and In re Stone,97 embraced—incorrectly in our view—the
US Supreme Court’s standard articulated in Jones v. Unites States,98 employing a
limited due process model in such cases),99 this language should still inform
decisionmakers in the individual cases at hand.
B.

The Most Recent Research on the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to
Predict Dangerousness to Any Level of Medical Certainty

The next question to confront is that of the accuracy of psychiatric
predictions,100 and here it is necessary to begin with the work of Professor John
Monahan.101 Monahan’s research is crystal clear and uncontroverted: unstructured
clinical assessments of dangerousness are neither valid nor reliable,102 and, at best,
they allow clinicians to distinguish violent from non-violent patients “with a
modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy.”103 By contrast, there are structured
risk assessment tools—employing different means of statistical or actuarial risk
assessment—now available that, by any measure of reckoning,104 are superior to the
unstructured assessments traditionally used.105However, as Monahan notes:
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

103
104

105

Krol, 344 A.2d at 299.
Id. at 303.
844 N.E.2d 285, 286 n.2 (N.Y. 2006).
740 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 2002).
463 U.S. 354 (1983) (rejecting arguments that it was unconstitutional to retain insanity acquittees for
longer periods of time than the maximum sentence for the underlying crime).
One of the authors (MLP) critiques this approach as anti-therapeutic in Michael L. Perlin, A Law of
Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 430 n.157(2000).
See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE
STATES 19–28 (2013); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 3.4.2.5, at 3-50 to 3-84.
Professor Monahan’s status as the “leading thinker on this issue” has been constant for over three
decades. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners,
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (Monahan, Forecasting); John Monahan,
Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
497, 498–99 (2006) (Monahan, hereinafter Developments).
Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 790 (1994) (discussing Prof. Monahan’s work).
William Grove & Paul Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and
Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 318 (1996) (“We know of no social science controversy for which the
empirical studies are so numerous, varied, and consistent as this one.").
Monahan, Forecasting, supra note 102, at 406–07; Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 511–13.
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The . . . scientific literature is clear that structured risk assessment is superior to
unstructured risk assessment in accurately predicting violent behavior. But are
mental health professionals heeding the research and using structured risk
assessments when assessing violence risk? The literature on the incorporation of
structured risk assessment into the clinical practice of predicting violence is thin, but
all of it suggests that only a minority of mental health professionals routinely employ
structured risk assessment.106

Importantly, the inability of psychiatric professionals to predict violence has been
specifically recognized by the US Supreme Court.107 However, most lower courts
have not embraced this finding, and continue to place tremendous amounts of
weight on risk assessment measures that are often outdated and scientifically
unreliable.108

106
107
108

See also, e.g., Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 409 (2001).
Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 511, 513.
See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1993) (stating that there are “difficulties inherent in
diagnosis of mental illness. It is thus no surprise that many psychiatric predictions of future violent
behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.” (internal citation omitted)).
For an analysis of common risk assessment tools, actuarial tools and standards of professional
judgment, see Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk Assessments
for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 21 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1 (2009); see
generally, JAY SINGH ET AL, THE INTERNATIONAL RISK SURVEY: USE AND PERCEIVED UTILITY OF
STRUCTURED VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN 44 COUNTRIES (2016).
Hanson and Morton-Bourgon discuss the use of risk assessment tools as they relate to
predictions of dangerousness, and how these predictions have become standard practice in many areas
of law. In particular, those working with sex offenders are particularly conscious of risk assessment
tools. Measures such as the STATIC-99 and STATIC-2002 have become, in many jurisdictions, the sole
measure of dangerousness prediction in many cases of civil commitment of a sex offender when
determining his future dangerousness. While some risk assessment measures may have limited success
in predicting actual recurrence of offenses, it is frequently the case that these tools will over-predict the
likelihood of re-offense. Risk assessments measure “static” and “dynamic” factors based on the
individual, but often do not have reliable predictability. Recent meta-analyses of the most popular risk
assessment measures have showed that, even with the addition of multiple factors supposedly linked to
recidivism, the predictive capabilities of these risk assessment measures has not dramatically
increased beyond its standard percentage of accuracy.
However, it is important to note that this meta-analysis also showed less predictive capability
in the unstructured professional judgment risk assessment determination than any of the actuarial
tools. While risk assessment for dangerousness in general for violent crimes and specifically for sex
offender recidivism is still not an entirely reliable or even, in the case of some less-tested instruments,
a valid measurement, it still prevails over the use of the “professional judgment” standard in any study
of effectiveness. On these questions in general, see Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far
From the Turbulent Space”: Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals
Accused of Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2015) (discussing these
instruments and the special abilities needed by counsel to understand them and to effectively crossexamine witnesses who rely on them); see generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 74.
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In short, if forensic clinicians are not using the sort of structural tools
discussed by Professor Monahan,109 then, simply, their predictions—though, in
hindsight, sometimes accurate—are not grounded on a valid and reliable scientific
basis.110 What is especially interesting here is that in at least two of its cases in this
area of the law, the New York Court of Appeals has identified imprecision of
psychiatric predictivity of dangerousness as a basis for its finding that “psychiatry
cannot now guarantee the safety of the public from future dangerous acts of persons
found not responsible . . . and will most likely be unable to do so in the foreseeable
future”111 and as a rationale for relying on legislative categorizations in this area of
the law.”112
This decision is a mixed blessing for clinicians and attorneys working in the
field of mental disability law.113 While it is important to recognize the inability of
risk assessment techniques to deliver precise predictions about dangerousness and
recidivism, it may be equally improper to allow an, at times, uninformed legislature
to “categorize” types of defendants based on their symptoms or diagnosis. The New
York Court of Appeals is correct in its decision to move away from the traditional
reliance on risk assessment measures, but it may be allowing a practice of
legislating dangerousness that will result in overbroad and far-reaching
categorizations of defendants.
While New York has a clear set of guidelines it follows in order to classify its
defendants and their anticipated levels of dangerousness, international mental
disability law continues to evolve and change based on worldwide developments and

109

110

111

112
113

Professor Monahan focuses in his recent writings on three: the HCR-20, the VRAG, and the COVR. See,
e.g., Monahan, Developments, supra note 102, at 504–12. For Professor Monahan’s latest writings in
this area, see John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, The Evolution of Violence Risk Assessment, 19 CNS
SPECTRUMS 419 (2014) (discussing the need for a continuum of structured approaches to risk
assessment). On the use of risk assessments in sentencing, see Nicholas Scurich & John Monahan,
Evidence-based Sentencing: Public Openness and Opposition to Using Gender, Age, and Race as Risk
Factors for Recidivism, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 36 (2016).
Some commentators go even further. See Anton Tolman & Kristine Mullendore, Risk Evaluations for
the Courts: Is Service Quality a Function of Specialization?, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. 225, 230 (2003) (“[T]his
approach to risk evaluation is clearly ignorant of the specialized body of knowledge that has accrued in
the past 2 decades and is characteristic of the ‘unstructured clinical approach’ to evaluation that has
been criticized repeatedly (citation omitted) as a method of insufficient reliability and validity for
making important judgments.”)
In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995) (citing 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2261 (McKinney)). See
also id.at 481 n. 5 (citing Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693 (1990)(“The voluminous literature
examining the ability of psychiatrists [or other mental health professionals] to predict dangerousness in
the indeterminate future has been virtually unanimous: ‘psychiatrists have absolutely no expertise in
predicting dangerous behavior.’”).
See In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 885 (N.Y. 1995) (relying on discussion in Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983), of the “very imprecision of the field of psychiatry.”).
Although counsel is assigned to all persons facing commitment in New York state, see N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. L. § 47.03, (McKinney 2007), there are many states without the sort of organized counsel system
present there. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 6-4.4, at 6–54 to 6-58.
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increased understanding of mental illness and dangerousness. 114 As we will discuss
further, the CRPD was a driving force in re-energizing a worldwide recognition of
the concepts of mental illness and dangerousness and how they relate to individuals
in psychiatric facilities.115
C. The Danger of Erroneous Diagnosis by Clinicians, and the Constitutional
Problems it Creates
Ultimately, the question must be asked: does the Constitution allow for an
individual to be confined indefinitely and deprived of his liberties based on expert
testimony in a field that rapidly changes and constantly redefines the parameters of
dangerousness, risk, and illness itself? Although psychiatry and psychiatric
diagnosis are accepted practices used to establish the criteria for civil commitment,
there has never been a challenge in front of the court that argued that the risk of
clinician error should be weighed against the diagnosis made and its ultimate
consequences. Notwithstanding this fact, we believe that this is a reasonable
question to consider.
The Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas,116 made it crystal-clear that the
reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate when individuals are being confined
based on a psychiatric diagnosis.117 The very nature of diagnoses is “based on
medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the
experience of the diagnostician.”118 Even with safeguards that act to quantify
diagnostic categories, such as the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (often characterized as the “gold standard” of
classification119), the subjectivity of a clinician’s diagnosis may be a constitutional
problem. The Addington Court has come closest to authentically confronting the
potential legal issues inherent in an erroneous psychiatric diagnosis with respect to
civil commitment.120 The Court there chose to recognize the subjectivity inherent in
diagnosing complex psychiatric behaviors and used a constitutional analysis to
implement a more appropriate standard than a simple preponderance quantum.121
However, no reported case as of yet has challenged an erroneous diagnosis and
subsequent civil commitment on a constitutional basis.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

See infra Part III.
See generally, PERLIN, supra note 26.
441 U.S. 416 (1979) (holding that a “clear and convincing” standard of proof is proper for involuntary
commitment).
Id. at 427–30.
Id. at 430.
E.g., Bruce Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 n. 36 (1998); Bruce Familant, The Essential Functions of Being a Lawyer with
a Non-Visible Disability: On the Wings of a Kiwi Bird, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 517, 526 n.53 (1998).
See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-2.3.2, at 4-97 (citing, inter alia, Donald Hermann, Barriers to
Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional
Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L.REV. 83, 85 (1986)).
Addington, 441 U.S. at 432–33.
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In contrast, the Court in Heller v. Doe wrote about the “[e]ase of diagnosis”
for individuals with developmental disabilities.122 Those diagnoses are based on
evidence of disability that is “well-documented throughout childhood” whereas
clinicians treating patients with mental illness often do not have the luxury of a
complete history of behaviors.123 In fact, the Court in Heller specifically recognized
the differences between the two types of diagnosis and stated, “as we recognized in
an earlier case, diagnosis of mental illness is difficult,” citing to Addington.124 The
potential for error seems to be recognized; however, there has been no effort made to
address the effects or consequences of erroneous diagnosis.125
This lack of adjustment in the law based on what is now known about the
potential for erroneous diagnosis may, however, not be solely due to lack of
recognition and effort. The conflation of risk with psychiatric diagnosis, made everpresent by ongoing sanism126 and heuristics,127 will lead to an imbalance in the
weighing of erroneous diagnosis versus unconstitutional confinement. Judges
concerned with their reputations (and, in some instances, their chances of reelection)128 will lean more heavily in favor of commitment regardless of the risk of
clinician error, which is unquantifiable and is virtually never presented as a
defense.129
When clinicians go through the process of making an informed diagnosis,
they are rarely concerned with “the law”; there is no safety measure built in to the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual130 to ensure
that an erroneous diagnosis does not lead to a future of unconstitutional
commitment and stigma.131 The law has only recently started to understand the
fallibility of risk assessment through a constitutional lens. The recognition of the
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 313 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 322.
On the question of Heller’s potential impact on the question of inaccuracy of dangerousness predictions
in cases involving individuals with mental illness, see PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-2.3.2.2, at 4105 to 4-106.
See sources cited supra note 32.
See BARAK, supra note 85, and supra note 86.
On this question in the parallel area of judicial decision-making in sex offender cases, see generally
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories In the Press”: The Impact of Media
Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185 (2013).
It is not clear why this is. Perhaps counsel for patients believe the argument is not sufficiently strong
and.or perhaps they are concerned that this might have a deleterious impact on their future
relationships with the same clinicians.
See generally, Michael L. Perlin, “I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881 (2015).
On ways that clinicians have been counseled by leaders in their field to ignore restrictive civil
commitment laws, see Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 644-45 (1993), discussing Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 501 (1976), arguing that “wise and
benevolent paternalism,” should lead to a “moral judgment” that hospitalization is appropriate for
patients “incapable of voluntarily accepting help,” in spite of laws rejecting “need of treatment” as a
commitment standard.
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danger of erroneous diagnosis is the next logical step for the court to take, following
on the hints of understanding of the devastating consequences of erroneous
commitment alluded to in Addington and Heller.
III.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PRINCIPLES132

Given the ratification of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities133 (CRPD), the state of the law as it relates to persons
with disabilities must be radically reconsidered. 134 The CRPD is “regarded as
having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their rights and to
participate in international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who
have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection.”135 This Convention—the
most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies
to persons with disabilities 136—furthers the human rights approach to disability
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect
of life.137 It firmly endorses a social model of disability as it reconceptualizes mental
health rights as disability rights. The Convention is a clear and direct repudiation
of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability
law.138 The Convention—“ushering in a new era of disability rights policy”139—
“sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a
132
133
134
135

136
137
138

139

This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5.
See generally G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26.
See generally PERLIN, supra note 26.
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (2008). See also, e.g., Statements made
by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Permanent Representative of
New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
convened by the UN Human Rights Council (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.crin.org/en/library/newsarchive/special-event-human-rights-council-new-disability-convention (last visited Apr. 20, 2017)
(quoting statements made by the High Commissioner For Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the
permanent representative of New Zealand and chair of the ad-hoc committee on a Comprehensive and
Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a special event on the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, convened by the UN Human Rights Council).
See, generally Perlin & Szeli, supra note 27; PERLIN, supra note 26, at 3–21; Perlin, supra note 27.
See e.g., Dhir, supra note 28.
See Paul Harpur & Richard Bales, The Positive Impact Of The Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: A Case Study on the South Pacific and Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 37 N. KY. L. REV.
363, 367 (2010) (CRPD is a “paradigm shift from the medical model to an environmental model to a
social justice model of disability”). See also Phillip Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental
Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”: The Impact of Wyatt v.
Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law,
35 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 121 (2011).
William P. Schurgin & Kristen McGurn, The ADA Amendments Act: Expanded Disability Challenges
for Health Care Employers, Issue No. 20, HEALTHCARE COMPL. REP. 10484213 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL
10484213. See also, Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011).
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particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities.” 140 It provides a
framework for ensuring that mental health laws “fully recognises the rights of those
with mental illness,”141 and mandates prescriptive rights in addition to proscriptive
rights.142 There is no question that the Convention has “ushered in a new era of
disability rights policy.”143
Disability is a condition that arises from “interaction with various barriers
[that] may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others” instead of inherent limitations.144 The Convention extends existing
human rights to take into account the specific rights experiences of persons with
disabilities,145 calling for “respect for inherent dignity”146 and “nondiscrimination.”147 Other articles declare “freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment,”148 “freedom from exploitation, violence and
abuse,”149 and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.” 150 Equality and
nondiscrimination are cornerstones of the CRPD’s mission. Nations must “recognize
that all persons are equal before and under the law,” and “prohibit all
discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities
equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.” 151 The
CRPD not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with
disabilities, but it also sets out explicitly the many steps that states must take to
create an enabling environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy
authentic equality in society.152
140

141
142

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to Participate in
Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L. J. 249, 256 (2009); see also Ronald McCallum, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections, SOC. SCI. RES.
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR. (Mar. 2010), http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1563883.
Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 L. CONTEXT:
SOCIO-LEGAL J. 1, 8 (2008).
Prescriptive rights require certain conduct, whereas proscriptive rights forbid particular behavior. See
generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should be The Norm?, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 198, 200 (2005). On the significance of the inclusion of proscriptive and prescriptive
rights in human rights treaties in general, see Robert Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging
Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 905, 920 (1994). On their significance in the CRPD context specifically, see Michael L. Perlin,
The Significance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – And Why It Demands the
Creation of an Asian/Pacific Disability Rights Tribunal, ANN. REP. KANAGAWA U. INST. LEGAL STUD.
(2014).
Harpur, supra note 138, at 1295.
G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26, at 4.
Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability
Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 514–15 (2008); See also PERLIN, supra note 26, at 143–58.
G.A. Res. 61/106, supra note 26, art. 3, ¶ A.
Id. at art. 3, ¶ B.
Id. at art. 15.
Id. at art. 16.
Id. at art. 17.
Id. at art. 5.
On the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil commitment laws
to comply with Convention mandates, see Bryan Y. Lee, Note, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of
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Although the United States has not yet ratified the CRPD, President Obama
signed the Convention in 2009.153 Under such circumstances, “a state’s obligations
under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties . . . which
requires signatories ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability
Convention’s] object and purpose.’”154 Domestic courts in New York have thus cited
the CRPD approvingly in cases involving guardianship matters.155 In one such case
Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen noted that that the CRPD was entitled to
“‘persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own laws and constitutional protections.”156
International human rights law demands—at the very least—individualized
assessments of risk prior to the imposition of restrictions that limit the liberty of a
patient, whether civil or forensic. By way of example, New York’s multi-tier
system157 may run afoul of the CRPD’s Article 5, which, if interpreted broadly, could

153

154

155

156
157

Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with
Developmental Disabilities, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 393, 432–45 (2011). See also István Hoffman
& György Könczei, Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with
Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
143, 163–67 (2010) (discussing the application of the CRPD to capacity issues); Perlin, supra note 32
(discussing the application of the CRPD to guardianship law); Michael L. Perlin, “There Are No Trials
Inside the Gates of Eden”: Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: LAW AND POLICY
193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton ed. 2013) (discussing the application of the CRPD to
mental health court systems); Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The
International Human Rights Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 301,
305 n.19 (2013) [hereinafter Yonder] (discussing the application of the CRPD to juvenile punishment
schemes); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of
Shame”: Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiliation , 24 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC’L JUST. 1 (2014)
(discussing the application of the CRPD to shaming and humiliating practices in the mental health
system); Kathryn D. DeMarco, Note, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 523,
541–57 (2012) (discussing the application of the CRPD to solitary confinement in correctional
institutions). .
See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, DISABILITY SCOOP (May 18,
2012), http:// www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/15654/. The Senate
failed to ratify the CRPD on December 4, 2012, for lack of a supermajority of votes. See U.S. Int'l'
Council on Disabilities, http://usicd.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The Democratic
leadership promised to bring the Convention up again for ratification in 2015. See Yonder, supra note
152.
See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. 2010) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treatises art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331), as discussed in Henry Dlugacz & Christopher
Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4
ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362–63 (2011).
See, e.g., Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (finding that due process requires that the guardianship
appointment be subject to a requirement of periodic reporting and review); In re Dameris L., 956
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sur. 2012) (finding substantive due process requirement of adherence to principal of
least restrictive alternative applies to guardianships sought for mentally retarded persons).
Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S. 2d at 855. See Perlin, supra note 32, at 1178 n.97 (discussing Dameris L. in this
context).
See supra text accompanying notes 45–50.
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prohibit all discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 158 In practice,
individuals with conditions predetermined to pose a risk can be transferred to a
more secure facility without a full due process hearing.159 Article 5 of the CRPD
may provide a basis on which to claim that it is improper to discriminate based on
the type of diagnosed disability, and that all transfers, regardless of diagnosed
conditions, warrant a full due process hearing.
In fact, strong arguments have been made that international human rights
law calls into question all currently-existing domestic civil commitment schemes,
especially if involuntary treatment is a possible “side product” of such
commitment.160 The UN’s Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has,
in a general comment, stated that “forced treatment . . . is a violation of [Articles
15, 16 and 17 of the CRPD].”161 The same Committee has characterized the
segregation of persons with disabilities in institutions as “a pervasive and insidious
problem that violates a number of rights guaranteed under the Convention.”162 An
annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is similarly quite
clear: “Legislation authorizing the institutionalization of persons with disabilities
on the grounds of their disability without their free and informed consent must be
abolished.”163 The international framework has now been put in place by the UN
and those nations that have ratified the CRPD. It now falls to the individual
nations and courts to uphold these mandates in case law and put into practice what
is so clearly expressed in the CRPD: individuals with disabilities are entitled to give

158

159
160
161
162
163

Lee, supra note 152, at 429. On the need for all participants in the forensic system to understand the
significance of international human rights as they affect cases of persons with mental disabilities, see
Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, “Where Souls Are Forgotten”: Cultural Competencies, Forensic
Evaluations and International Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 257, 258 (2009).
E.g., Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. ex rel. Aliza K. v. Ford, 705 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (1998).
This is clearly contemplated under New York case law. See, e.g., Ernst J. v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186 (2d Cir.
2006); In re Eric U., 835 N.Y.S. 2d 518 ( N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Comm. on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 ¶ 42, (2014), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/031/20/PDF/G1403120.pdf?OpenElement.
Id. ¶ 46.
Annual Report of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights & Reports of the Office of the High Comm’r
and the Secretary-General, Thematic Study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on enhancing awareness and understanding of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009). See also Interim Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008) (“Many States, with or without a legal basis,
allow for the detention of persons with mental disabilities in institutions without their free and
informed consent, on the basis of the existence of a diagnosed mental disability often together with
additional criteria such as being a ‘danger to oneself and others’ or in ‘need of treatment.’ The Special
Rapporteur recalls that article 14 of CRPD prohibits unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty and
the existence of a disability as a justification for deprivation of liberty.”).
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consent on institutionalization, a critical matter affecting their freedom and
liberties.164
There is limited relevant case law from the inter-regional human rights
courts and commissions, but what little case law does exist supports the arguments
set forth in this Article. In Case of Furlan and Family v. Argentina,165 a case
involving a fourteen-year-old who suffered from permanent brain damage as a
result of an accident on a field that was the property of the Argentinean army, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in ordering reparations and equitable
relief, relied on the CRPD for the proposition that it was “imperative” that states
adopt “affirmative measures to “respect and ensure human rights,” “according to the
particular protection needs” of the individual person,166 so as to “promote social
inclusion practices.”167 The fact that, by way of example, there is no right to a
hearing under New York’s track transfer scheme168 falls afoul of the “affirmative
measures” requirement mandated by the Furlan court.
Elsewhere, in a child care case involving a potential loss of custody of a
premature baby on the part of a mother with learning disabilities, the European
Court of Human Rights found that the state’s procedures provided an effective
vehicle through which a guardian’s actions could be challenged, and thus it found no
violation of the CRPD.169 However, in the course of its opinion, that court noted
that, under the Convention, the state was obligated to provide “appropriate
accommodation to facilitate disabled persons’ effective role in legal proceedings.”170
Again, there is no evidence that such “appropriate accommodation[s]” are made in
cases involving changes in track status in New York or parallel proceedings in other
domestic jurisdictions.171
Even with mounting support in international human rights law, nations
continue to ignore the basic rights given in the CRPD to individuals with
disabilities. New York and other US jurisdictions have consistently failed to
recognize the need for a more comprehensive due process system for individuals
who are to be transferred to a secure facility. The international cases that
appropriately recognize the rights of individuals with disabilities show that there is
widespread recognition of the importance of giving a voice to these marginalized
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

On the implications of such arguments for the viability of mental status defenses in the criminal law,
see Perlin, supra note 29 (both the incompetency status and the insanity defense are compatible with
and required by the CRPD).
Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246 (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/resumen_246_ing.pdf.
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
Id.
See sources cited supra note 45; see also Savastano v. Nurnberg, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 1989)
(finding transfer from municipal acute-care facility to hospital without a hearing constitutional).
See R.P. v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22–23; Glor v. Switzerland, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11.
R.P., 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21.
For a discussion of other European cases finding extensive human rights violations in cases involving
persons with mental disabilities, see Perlin, supra note 32, at 1169–70.
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individuals. It is the hope of these authors that the United States follows suit and
ends the pervasive patterns and practices of discriminatory legislation.
In a recent paper, one of the authors (MLP) and another co-author focused on
six issues involving forensic patients that needed to be re-conceptualized in light of
these developments:172









Although there is a robust literature on the CRPD and on the UN Convention
against Torture, there is virtually no mention of the plight of forensic
patients. So, even within the world of those who focus broadly on these
human rights issues, this population has remained invisible.
Conditions at forensic facilities around the world continue to “shock the
conscience,” and it is essential that any “anti-torture” publication (such as
this one) highlight this.
Even when regional courts and commissions have found international human
rights violations in cases involving forensic patients (e.g., Victor Rosario
Congo v. Ecuador)173, the discussion of these cases largely ignores the
plaintiffs’ statuses as forensic patients
There are few lawyers and fewer “mental disability advocates” providing
legal and advocacy services to this population,
There is little mention in the survivor movement literature about the specific
plight of forensic patients.
Forensic patients in facilities for persons with intellectual disabilities are
particularly absent from the discourse. 174

In the course of that paper, we argued that the treatment of forensic patients
globally violated international human rights law principles.175 We believe that it is
imperative that institutional administrators begin to come to grips with the
significance of these principles for the population in question.
A. Therapeutic Jurisprudence176
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two
decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence

172
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175
176

See generally Perlin & McClain, supra note 158.
Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 63/99, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., ¶ 54 (1999), discussed
in this context in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-based Mental Disability Law Program:
Implications for Social Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 447–
48 (2007).
Perlin & Schriver, supra note 5, at 201–02.
Id. at 216–17.
This section is partially adapted from Perlin, Wisdom, supra note 18, at 361–64, Perlin, Yonder, supra
note 152, at 330–36, and Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with
Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 277–79 (2014). Further, it
distills the work of one of the co-authors (MLP) over the past two decades, beginning with Michael L.
Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).
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(TJ).177 TJ recognizes that the law—potentially a therapeutic agent—can have
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for individuals involved in both the
civil and criminal justice systems.178 The critical question is whether legal rules,
procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their
therapeutic potential while, at the same time, not subordinating principles of due
process?179 Professor David Wexler, one of the creators of this field of
scholarship/theory, has been clear about this for over two decades the law’s use of
“mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning . . . [cannot]
imping[e] upon justice concerns,”180a position with which we entirely agree.181
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives,”182 focusing on
the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.183 TJ seeks to
inform lawyering practices and influence policy “by using social science data and
methodology to study the extent to which a legal rule, procedure, or practice
promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects.”184 It
177

178

179

180
181

182
183
184

See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990);
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 6–11 (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24
TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 2–6, at 2-43 to 2-66. Wexler first used the
term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler,
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27,
32–33 (1992).
See Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009); Kate Diesfeld &
Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN
HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds. 2006) (offering a transnational perspective).
See Perlin, supra note 6, at 510 n.139; Perlin, supra note 10, at 719 n.195. On how therapeutic
jurisprudence “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare
the law's sanist façade,’” see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s
Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008),
quoting, in part, PERLIN, supra note 2, at 301. See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–
86 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transformation through the Teaching and
Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
561, 599 n.111 (2005).
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPL. &
PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
“An inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and
civil liberties.” Perlin, supra note 99, at 412; Michael L. Perlin, Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the
Borderline: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782
(1998).
Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims of Crime,
33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, in
DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., eds., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION
45 (2000).
Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing up his Medicine”: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence & Clinical Teaching, Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Issues, Analysis, and
Applications, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 353–54 (2000). See also Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic

2017]

“Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair”

435

mandates that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent
with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and
wellness.”185 In this context, it has been suggested that psychological health is a
“fundamental legal interest.”186
TJ utilizes socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications,187
and it is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law toward
establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal
issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully.188 TJ has thus been described
as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards
a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s]
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”189 TJ thus supports an
ethic of care.190
TJ and its practitioners place great importance on the principle of a
commitment to dignity.191 Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”: voice,
validation and voluntariness,192 arguing:
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Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193, 197 (1995) (TJ “adopt[s] a
preference for laws that promote well-being”).
Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23,
26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
Douglas B. Marlowe et al., A Sober Assessment of Drug Courts, 16 FED. SENT’G REP., 153, 155 (2003).
Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra note 178, at 582.
Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION, supra note 183, at 465. On
the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence, procedural justice and restorative justice, see
generally PERLIN, supra note 12.
Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328,
329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges
for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING
PROFESSION 341 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic,
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2006). The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 73 (1982).
See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach to Enriching
Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note
189; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor
Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597,
599 (2007); Winick & Wexler, supra note 189, at 605–07.
On the explicit link between TJ and the notion of “ethic of care,” see Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself:
An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between the Ethic of Care, the Feeling Decisionmaking
Preference, and Lawyer Wellbeing, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 122 n.234 (2008); Susan Daicoff,
Making Law Therapeutic For Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and the Psychology
of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y. & L. 811 (1999).
See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005). See
generally PERLIN, supra note 12; Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden,” supra note 152.
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What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or
a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal
has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and
validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings
prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own
decisions.193

The question to be posed here is this: to what extent are the practices and
procedures discussed in this paper consonant with TJ? Do they best ensure that
these principles written about by Professor Ronner—the principles of voluntariness,
voice, and validation—be fulfilled in matters involving residents of forensic
institutions? Certainly, there is little about what happens that is voluntary on the
part of the patients; maximum security facilities bespeak involuntariness in se.194
There is little evidence that the patients in question have much of a voice (if at all)
in their treatment or in the conditions of their confinement.195 Although we know
that fairness and procedural justice inevitably increase compliance with court
orders,196 we also know that procedural justice is often solely lacking in all forensic
facility decision making.197 One of us (MLP), in writing some years ago about sexual
autonomy in psychiatric hospitals, concluded, “Much of the case law ignores forensic
patients entirely.”198 So do the developments expanding TJ concepts to
institutionalized persons in general largely ignore forensic patients?
At the outset, there is no evidence that there is any requirement that New
York’s risk assessment measures comport with the ways that the behavioral
community agrees are most likely to yield accurate and valid findings: through the
192
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Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance
of “voice,” see also DIESFELD & FRECKELTON, supra note 178, at 588.
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002). See generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW,
LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
Consider in this context Joel Haycock’s caution that therapeutic jurisprudence risks should not be
considered solely from the perspective of the clinician, but, rather, from the “perspective of the objects
of the mental health law.” Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 317 (1994).
On the question of, for example, the freedom of sexual autonomy in forensic facilities, see generally,
Perlin, supra note 6; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY, AND THE LAW:
BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016).
Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 9, at 69 (citing Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter?:
The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 160 (1997)).
See, e.g., Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 874–878 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
Perlin, supra note 6, at 488.
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use of the sort of structured risk assessment instruments urged by Professor
Monahan and his colleagues.199 In an assessment of the potential value of TJ in the
rehabilitation of persons with severe mental illness, William Spaulding and his
colleagues stress that “everyone is best served when the determinations of risk upon
which restrictive interventions are based must be as accurate, precise, and complete
as clinical technology allows.”200
This sort of assessment was specifically endorsed by the late Professor Bruce
Winick—one of the two original “fathers” of TJ—in an article he wrote about
applying the law therapeutically in domestic violence cases, one that relies
extensively on Professor Monahan’s work.201 The risk management model, Prof.
Winick noted, is supported by the principles of TJ, providing an individual with
incentives through which “to modify his behavior in order to reduce the extent or
restrictiveness of the conditions imposed by the court”; 202 such a model also
provides incentives, Winick argues, to “minimize or avoid the interferences with
[individuals’] liberty that are justified as a result of the determination that they are
dangerous.”203 Beyond this, Professor Spaulding and his colleagues—in line with,
though chronologically pre-dating, Professor Ronner’s call for “voice”—conclude
that, “If patients can become more involved in the risk evaluation itself, then
patients’ involvement in treatment can be fostered; thus more compliance with
treatment and aftercare planning can be expected in the long run,”204 and they note
that, “At the very least, involving patients in risk evaluations does not appear to
have anti-therapeutic consequences.”205 There is, to the best of our knowledge, no
such patient involvement in the New York system. With the stated outcome as
treatment and recovery, it only makes sense that individuals are included and
engaged in matters involving their hospitalization.206 Jurisdictions that choose not
199
200

201
202
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204
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206

It is telling that there is not a single reported New York case that cites to Professor Monahan’s
research on risk assessment.
William Spaulding, Jeffrey Poland, Eric Elbogen & A. Jocelyn Ritchie, Applications of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in Rehabilitation for People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 135, 161–62 (2000). On the need for therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights
principles to be integrated in the treatment of offenders, see Astrid Birgden, Maximizing Desistance:
Adding Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Human Rights to the Mix, 42 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19 (2015).
Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33
(2000).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 53.
Spaulding et al., supra note 200, at 169.
Id.
See Ronner, supra note 192, at 94–95 (on the need for “voice”). In a recent article about dignity and the
civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic
jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus specifically on this issue of voice: “When procedures
give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to
them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coercion.” Jonathan Simon &
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking Commitment Law in an Age of Mass
Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 51 (2015). It is important to consider how this “plays out” in the
context of what is discussed in this paper.
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to allow patient involvement should recognize the therapeutic benefits of giving a
patient a stake in his recovery. Not only will it provide that patient with a voice, but
it will also lead to better aggregate data in risk assessments, since the cooperation
of a patient greatly increases the kind of information gained in risk evaluations and
allows for a more individualized assessment.207 Finally, a turn to TJ principles will
make it more likely that the international human rights principles discussed here
will be privileged.208
CONCLUSION / RECOMMENDATIONS
In general, many courts in the United States continue to rely on imperfect
and potentially prejudicial risk assessment measures to make determinations about
a patient’s appropriate, and least restrictive, setting for continued treatment. While
some courts lag behind on recognizing the dangers (to the patients) that may arise
from improper determinations of a patient’s risk, New York has proven itself
somewhat ahead of many other state courts. When taken together, the New York
Court of Appeals decisions in this area form a partially coherent body of case law.
We say “partially coherent,” however, because there are important gaps in this
statement of the law: how do we determine and define “dangerousness” in this
context, and how do we contextualize this definition with (1) the constitutional
requirements of the LRA and (2) the demonstrated invalidity of unstructured
interviews? Although there is an important database of cases (all from other
jurisdictions) that consider the positive attributes of structured interviews, these all
deal with assessment of alleged sexually violent predators and persons with antisocial personality disorders, not institutional placements.209 We are thus still in
unchartered territory.
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The mental health court model requires active participation from the individuals involved. Not only
does this promote the therapeutic jurisprudential tenets of voice and validation, but it leads to an
overall improvement in services and long-term outcomes when those individuals are fully involved in
their case services and treatment plans. See Ginger Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving
Justice and Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 587 (2010) (“Participation in
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Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENT. HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2013).
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Perlin, supra note 30; see also Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 206, at 36–41 (discussing the
international human rights implications of involuntary civil commitment policies).
See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (Psychopathy Checklist Revised
[“PCL-R”] admissible); Lee v. State, 854 So. 2d 709, 711–12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Rapid Risk
Assessment for Sex Offense Recidivism [“RRASOR”], Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised
[“MnSOST-R”], PCL-R, Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide [“SORAG”], and Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide [“VRAG”] admissible), as cited in Monahan, Forecasting, supra note 102, at 408–09 n.71.
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So, what should be done? Here are some recommendations:









It is absolutely essential that the LRA principles be considered
in every case. As the highest court in the United States has
routinely upheld a patient’s right to be treated in the least
restrictive environment,210 it should be regarded as legally
operative in determining the actual placement of all patients.
Freedom from a secure facility or an allegedly non-secure facility
that has increasingly become secure is a right guaranteed by the
concept of the LRA, when appropriate for the particular patient,
and must considered in each case as a unique and
individualized determination.
It is absolutely essential that each state develop a mechanism
through which organized, dedicated counsel is available to all
forensic patients.211
It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize
themselves with the bases of international human rights law so
as to insure that the rights guaranteed by the CRPD are applied
to all forensic patients.
It is absolutely essential that decision-makers familiarize
themselves with the basic principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence so as to best insure that the three principles
articulated by Professor Ronner—voice, voluntariness and
validation—be honored in forensic facilities.
Finally, it is absolutely essential that all persons doing clinical
evaluations familiarize themselves with John Monahan’s recent
writings on dangerousness predictions, on the failure of
unstructured interviews, and on the need to use structured risk
assessment tools.

We believe that if clinicians take these recommendations seriously, many of
the dilemmas we have been discussing will be ameliorated. It is impossible for us to
achieve meaningful mitigating change in our mental disability law system unless
we begin to take these issues seriously and to re-envision the way we regulate the
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See supra text accompanying notes 65–72.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial: Global
Perspective on Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its
Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 241, 242 (2008) (saying it is clear
that “only in those jurisdictions that had dedicated counsel programs was there any coherent body of
reported civil commitment case law.”); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 6-4.2 at 6-53 (“It appears
beyond dispute that an organized and regularized scheme for providing . . . counsel comes closest to
guaranteeing at least minimally adequate counsel.”).
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practice of mental disability law (especially, though not exclusively, institutional
mental disability law) using these tools of legal change.212
We conclude by reconsidering both parts of our title. Clearly, the “clinician’s
dilemma” is a real one. Balancing the factors of “risk,” “security,” and “danger” with
“constitution[al]” mandates is not an easy task. But it is one that must be done. And
for the lyric: some may be puzzled why we chose a song that is about “isolation,
desolation and failure.”213 But we think the line in question resonates in this
context. This work—the assessment of “danger”—can certainly feel like “toiling.”
But also the remainder of the phrase—“the morals of despair”—is just as relevant.
This work can inspire feelings of “despair.” But it must be infused with a sense of
“moral[ity]” as well. And we believe that, the incorporation of these
recommendations into this work, will, in the long run, lessen the level of “despair.”
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